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THE UNITED STATES, CHINA & THE BASEL
CONVENTION ON THE TRANSBOUNDARY
MOVEMENTS OF HAZARDOUS WASTES AND
THEIR DISPOSAL
Mark Bradford*
T he Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Move-
ments of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal' ("Basel Con-
vention" or the "Convention") is the first global regulatory re-
gime imposed upon the international trade, both legal and
illegal, in hazardous solid and chemical wastes.2 The Convention
concluded on March 22, 1989 at the end of a three-day United
Nations Environment Programme ("UNEP") conference at-
tended by representatives of 116 states and observers from 34
non-governmental organizations. 3 The Convention entered into
force on May 5, 1992.4 The United States became one of the
* J.D. Candidate, May 1998 Fordham University School of Law.
1. Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements
of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, Mar. 22, 1989, U.N. Doc.
UNEP/WG.190/4, 28 I.L.M. 649 [hereinafter Basel Convention or
Convention]
2. See United Nations Officials See Basel Treaty As 'Limping' Into Effect
with Limited Support, Int'l Env't Daily (BNA) (May 22, 1992) [hereinaf-
ter Treaty Limping Into Effect] (quoting UNEP Executive Director Mos-
tafa Tolba on the objectives and innovations of the Convention).
3. See United Nations Environment Programme Conference of
Plenipotentiaries on the Global Convention on the Control of Trans-
boundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes: Final Act and Text of Basel
Convention, Mar. 22, 1989, UNEP/WG.190/4, 28 I.L.M. 649, 652-53
(1989) (listing participants).
4. By its terms, the Basel Convention entered into force ninety
days after twenty nations had ratified it. See Basel Convention, supra
note 1, art. 25, § 1. The first twenty nations to ratify the Conventions
were (in chronological order): Jordan, Switzerland, Saudi Arabia, Hun-
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Convention's first signatories on March 22, 1990.5
In the seven years since then, however, the U.S. Congress has
failed to enact the legislation necessary to ratify the Convention. 6
In no way does the long delay in U.S. ratification moot the en-
hancement of the Convention that would likely result if the
United States became a full participant. The United States gener-
ates more hazardous waste than any other nation in the world.
Despite its capacity for disposing much of this hazardous waste
domestically, the U.S. is a primary exporter of such waste as
well.7 It is on account of the United States' extensive involvement
in the trade - and not despite it - that ratification would be di-
rectly beneficial to U.S. interests.
The prospective benefits of ratification are most clearly exem-
plified by the United States' relationship with the People's Re-
public of China. The United States and China are the most pow-
erful nations in the industrialized and developing worlds,
respectively. The division between industrialized and developing
nations is the controlling dynamic within the process of formu-
lating global regulation of hazardous waste traffic. The process is
gary, Norway, France, Panama, Mexico, Romania, Nigeria, Argentina,
Czechoslovakia, Sweden, Finland, El Salvador, China (on Dec. 17,
1991), Uruguay, Syria, Liechtenstein, Australia. Accordingly, the Con-
vention entered into force on May 5, 1992, ninety days after Australia's
ratification on Feb. 5, 1992. See Status of Signatures and Ratifications
for Basel Convention: There are 108 ratifications as of January 13, 1997
(visited Mar. 16, 1997) <http://www.unep.ch/sbc/ratif.html> (hereinaf-
ter Basel Status].
5. See Basel Status, supra note 4.
6. The Basel Convention is a "non-self-executing" treaty, meaning
that the United States may not become a full party to the Convention,
nor may the Convention bind the U.S. legally, until Congress has en-
acted the requisite implementing legislation, bringing U.S. law into
conformity with the terms of the Convention. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNITED STATES § 111 cmt. h
(1987). See infra text accompanying notes 91-96. Apart from the U.S.,
the only signatories that are not party-states to the Convention are Af-
ghanistan, Haiti and Thailand. See Basel Status, supra note 4.
7. See Hazardous Waste: Mishandled Exports Would Be Returned To U.S.
Under Administration's New Policy, Daily Env't Rep. (BNA), at dl0 (March
2, 1994). "Based on U.S. Customs Service reports, the [U.S. Chamber
of Commerce] estimated that the United States each year exports be-
tween 16 million and 20 million tons of waste that is covered under the
Basel Convention." Id.
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characterized by the need for the community of nations to col-
lectively prevent hazardous wastes from being transported to
those nations that not only lack the means to dispose of them
safely, but also may lack the means to effectively prevent their il-
licit importation.
China has become a major economic power following less than
two decades of massive industrial development. 8 While China
generates an accordingly large amount of waste of its own,9 it is
also currently one of the world's largest importers of such wastes
from exporting countries, such as the United States.10 Although
China and the United States signed the Basel Convention on the
same day, the United States has yet to ratify the treaty. In con-
trast, China ratified in 1991.12 This division has contributed to
8. Following Deng Xiao-Ping's assumption of the Premiership in
the late 1970s, China's documented gross domestic product rose from
approximately $302 billion in 1981 to $817 billion in 1996. See Nicholas
D. Kristof, The Communist Dynasty Had Its Run. Now What?, N.Y TIMES,
Feb. 23, 1997, § 4, at 1. For the past fifteen years, China's economy has
grown at an average rate of 9% annually and is today one of the tenth
largest in the world. See Deng's China: The Last Emperor, ECONOMIST, Feb.
22, 1997, at 21.
9. See China: Government to Step Up Inspections in Bid to Curb Trans-
ports of Toxic Waste, 19 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 229, (Mar. 20, 1996)
[hereinafter Government to Step Up Inspections].
10. Greenpeace estimates that between 1990 and 1993, toxic waste
moving from the United States to China totaled 220,665 metric tons
(twenty times the combined total for Australia, Canada, Germany and
the U.K.), although during that period far more toxic waste of U.S.
provenance went to India and South Korea. Greenpeace Report Says Asian
Countries Being Used as Dumping Ground for Waste, 17 Int'l Env't Rep.
(BNA) 113, 114 (Feb. 9, 1994) [hereinafter Greenpeace Report].
11. See Basel Status, supra note 4.
12. See id. As of January 13, 1997, the following 88 entities have rat-
ified the Basel Convention since Australia's ratification on Feb. 5, 1992
allowed the Convention to enter into force: Antigua, Austria, Bahamas,
Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria,
Burundi, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Costa Rica, Cote d'
Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, Estonia, Euro-
pean Economic Community, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea,
Honduras, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Islamic Republic of Iran, Ireland,
Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Leba-
non, Luxembourg, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mauritania, Mauritius,
Micronesia, Monaco, Morocco, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zea-
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one of the most intriguing, albeit least-publicized, of the recent
disputes between the two governments.
In May 1996, the Chinese government announced that it had
filed a formal protest to the Secretariat of the Basel Convention
over alleged illegal transfers of hazardous waste from the U.S. to
China.1 3 If both China and the United States had been party-
states to the Basel Convention, the two governments would be
authorized to seek a resolution of the dispute through negotia-
tion, adjudication by the International Court of Justice, or
through the formal arbitration process outlined in the Conven-
tion.14 However, the United States was not - and is not - a party-
state and the Convention is not legally binding upon it. Thus, to-
day, a formal complaint under the Convention 5 would have little
legal significance.
As a political gesture, China's announcement was compro-
mised somewhat by its timing: essentially lost amidst the acrimo-
nious Sino-U.S. negotiations over China's observance of Ameri-
can intellectual property rights.16 Even if China's threatened
protest over hazardous waste was merely rhetorical, however, the
rhetoric illuminates the hazardous waste issue on two levels at
once. First, beneath the high politics, China's actions point up
land, Oman, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines,
Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Russian Federation, Saint Kitts and Nevis,
Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Senegal, Seychelles, Sin-
gapore, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Trinidad
and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates,
United Kingdom, Uzbekistan, Vietnam, Yemen, Zaire and Zambia. See
id.
13. See China Accuses U.S. of Dumping Illegal Waste: Formal Protest Al-
leges Violation of Treaty, S.F. CHRON., June 1, 1996, at Cl, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Sfchrn File.
14. See Basel Convention, supra note 1, art. 20 & Annex VI.
15. It is not at all clear that the Chinese government has actually
filed any formal protest with the Basel Convention. In response to a
query from this author via electronic mail message, Susan Bragdon of
the UNEP Press Office in Geneva indicated that as of December 5,
1996, she could locate no information pertaining to any such com-
plaint. See Electronic message from Susan Bragdon, Legal Officer,
UNEP Press Office, to Mark Bradford (Dec. 5, 1996) (copy on file with
the Fordham Environmental Law Journal).
16. See Seth Faison, China Convicts American as Trash Smuggler, N.Y
TIMES, Jan. 14, 1997, at A3.
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the unambiguous threat posed to the international community
by China's woeful environmental condition after years of unregu-
lated importation and improper disposal of hazardous waste. Sec-
ond, however, on the level of rhetoric per se, the Chinese gov-
ernment's ambiguous protests serve to indicate the true
significance of the Basel Convention as it stands and what its po-
tential might be if the U.S. became a party.
As this Note indicates, China has no avenues of direct legal re-
dress against the United States under the Basel Convention. 17
Yet, China's apparent lack of options reveals a far more notable
lack of options for the United States. Due to its current non-
party status, the U.S. lacks any avenues through which it may ef-
fectively in~fluence international policy on hazardous waste trans-
port and disposal. In addition, the U.S. cannot even negotiate
export agreements with other individual states outside the Con-
vention's seemingly limited regulatory regime. Thus, China's pro-
test to the Basel Convention demonstrates irrefutably that the Ba-
sel Convention works - even indirectly. It also clearly indicates
that ratification of the Convention by the United States is not
only vital to its own interests, but also to the furtherance of the
Convention as a genuinely effective instrument of international
environmental policy.
This Note advocates the immediate ratification of the Basel
Convention by the United States. Part I of this Note examines
the practical and legal difficulties inherent in regulating the
transboundary movement of hazardous wastes and appraises the
ways in which these difficulties have been addressed in the Basel
Convention and in subsequent agreements. I8 Part II surveys the
respective policies of the United States and China in relation to
the Basel Convention and the transboundary trade in hazardous
wastes. Part III assesses the putative options for the Chinese gov-
ernment in seeking legal redress from the United States within
the context of the Convention and the principles of interna-
tional law. This Note concludes with an appraisal of the positive
17. See infra text accompanying notes 180-81.
18. This Note will address only the trade in hazardous chemical
and solid wastes intended for territorial disposal. It will address neither
nuclear wastes, which are not regulated by the Basel Convention, nor
the dumping of wastes at sea, which would be affected by the Basel
Convention only insofar as the dumping occurs within territorial wa-
ters. See Basel Convention, supra note 1, art. 1, § 3 & art. 2, § 9.
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effects of the Basel Convention, even where it does not directly
apply, and of the significantly greater effect the Convention
would likely have if the United States ratified it.
I. THE BASEL CONVENTION ON THE TRANSBOUNDARY MOVEMENTS
OF HAZARDOUS WASTES AND THEIR DISPOSAL
A. Hazardous Waste and the Principles of Environmental Law
It is formally appropriate that the necessarily rapid growth of
international environmental regulation should have outstripped
the concurrent development and convergence of underlying
"customary" law.' 9 While customary law may in fact be catching
up,2 0 the disjunction has perennially complicated both the for-
mulation and application of international environmental regula-
tory schemes. Nowhere is this problem better exemplified than
in multilateral efforts to control the transboundary movements
of hazardous wastes.
Arguably the most venerable of customary environmental law
principles, arising from the Corfu Channel21 and Trail Smelter Arbi-
tration22 cases, is the corollary that every sovereign state is obliged
to ensure that activities within its jurisdiction do not damage, or
compromise the rights of, any other state.23 This rule was for-
19. See KATHARINA KUMMER, INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT OF HAZARD-
OUS WASTES: THE BASEL CONVENTION AND RELATED LEGAL RULES 25
(1995).
20. See ALEXANDRE KISS AND DINAH SHELTON, INTERNATIONAL ENVI-
RONMENTAL LAw 55 (Supp. 1994) ("The number of treaties and other
international instruments reproducing the same legal norms concern-
ing the environment continues to grow .... The work of the Interna-
tional Law Commission shows that the repetition of the same norms in
numerous international instruments can be considered as giving birth
to new customary rules.").
21. (U.K. v. Alb.) 1949 I.CJ. Rep 4.
22. (U.S. v. Can.) 3 U.N. Rep. Int'l Arb. Awards 1905 (1941).
23. See 1949 I.CJ. Rep 4, 44; 3 U.N. Rep. Int'l Arb. Awards 1905,
1965. "[U]nder the principles of international law ... no State has the
right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a manner as to
cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another." 3 U.N. Rep.
Int'l Arb. Awards 1905, 1965. See also Valentina 0. Okaru, Article, The
Basel Convention: Controlling the Movement of Hazardous Wastes to Develop-
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mally adopted as a guiding legal principle for international envi-
ronmental law in Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration, is-
sued by the first U.N. Conference on the Human Environment
in 1972:24
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Na-
tions and the principles of international law, the sovereign
right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own envi-
ronmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activi-
ties within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to
the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits
of national jurisdiction.25
In the negotiation of international environmental agreements
since then, the application of this principle has been reasonably
straightforward. Nations have collectively sought to limit pollut-
ing activities that have transboundary effects, such as sulfur diox-
ide emissions that cause acid rain 26 or potentially unsafe nuclear
facilities. 27 Since the issuing of the Stockholm Declaration and
the founding of the United Nations Environmental Programme
("UNEP") the following year,28 the immediate tactical objectives
have been twofold. First, nations have attempted to formulate an
acceptable set of standards that will at least limit the acceleration
of global environmental damage. Second, they have concurrently
sought to ameliorate the relative expense to developing nations
of complying with such standards, both in terms of direct en-
forcement costs and in slowed economic development.
29
ing Countries, 4 FORDIAM ENVTL. L. REP. 137, 156 (1993).
24. Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Envi-
ronment, June 16, 1972, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14 & Corr. 1 [hereinaf-
ter Stockholm Declaration].
25. Id. at 7.
26. See Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution,
Geneva, Nov. 13, 1979, T.I.A.S. No. 10541, 18 I.L.M. 1442.
27. See Convention on Nuclear Safety, Sept. 20, 1994, S. TREATY
Doc. No. 104-6 (1995), IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/449.
28. Institutional and Financial Arrangements for International Environ-
mental Co-operation, G.A. Res. 2997, U.N. GAOR, 27th Sess., 2112th plen.
mtg. at 43, U.N. Doc. A/8730 (1972).
29. See Stockholm Declaration, supra note 24, at 5 (Principles 9, 11,
13, & 14); see also William K. Stevens, Ideas & Trends: Ecological Threats,
Rich-Poor Tensions, N.Y TIMES, March 26, 1989, § 4, at 18; Sylvia F. Liu,
Note, The Koko Incident: Developing International Norms for the Trans-
boundary Movement of Hazardous Waste, 8 J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVrL. L.
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The regulation of the transboundary movement of hazardous
wastes, however, presents at least one very significant conceptual
difference from other forms of international environmental regu-
lation. International environmental regulatory regimes have gen-
erally been designed to discourage states from externalizing the
costs of their domestic polluting activity and, in theory, hold
such states liable for doing so.30 The regulation of the trans-
boundary trade in hazardous waste, in contrast, seeks to discour-
age the transfer of a state's polluting activity from one national ju-
risdiction to another. This "pollution source transfer" problem
entails a specifically legal dilemma as well. Any liability mecha-
nism imposed along with a regulatory scheme must address -
within a single transaction - a number of wrongful acts occurring
within the jurisdictions of at least two sovereign states: (1) im-
proper export of waste from the sending state, (2) improper
handling in a transit state (if any), and (3) improper import and
disposal of the waste in the receiving state.'
Consequently, "pollution source transfer" entails a fundamen-
tal complication of the "polluter pays" cost-allocation principle,
formulated by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development ("OECD") in the early 1970s, by which a source
country is held liable for transboundary pollution.3 2 Unmodified
"polluter pays" means that the export of wastes would simply be
the most cost-effective option for waste-producing nations. Prior
to the efforts of the international community to regulate the
trade, this was irrefutably so.
Ironically, the enactment of increasingly strict domestic envi-
ronmental standards by many industrialized states33 has made it
121, 150-51 (1992-93).
30. See Stockholm Declaration, supra note 24, at 7 (Principle 22).
"States shall co-operate to develop further the international law regard-
ing liability and compensation for the victims of . . . environmental
damage caused by activities within the jurisdiction or control of such
States to areas beyond their jurisdiction." Id. (emphasis added).
31. See KUMMER, supra note 19, at 15-16.
32. See OECD Council Recommendation on Guiding Principles
Concerning International Economic Aspects of Environmental Policies,
adopted May 26, 1972, O.E.C.D. Doc. C(72)128, Annex A(a), in ORGANI-
SATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, OECD & THE
ENVIRONMENT 24 (1986).
33. See Alexandre Kiss, The International Control of Transboundary
Movement of Hazardous Waste, 26 TEX. INT'L LJ. 521, 529 (1991).
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imperative for hazardous waste producers in those countries to
export their waste. Legal domestic disposal is difficult, if not im-
.possible, for waste producers in a number of developed nations.
34
In many cases, export of hazardous waste may be the only practi-
cal disposal option in environmental as well as economic terms.
35
Generally, however, the export of wastes by producers in in-
dustrialized countries has been primarily a matter of limiting dis-
posal costs for waste producers by transferring the source of the
pollution, in effect the polluting activity itself, along with its at-
tendant costs. The "pollution source transfer" concept points up
the fact that all of the nations that are party to an improper
waste transaction are, in essence, polluters. Yet, the state ulti-
mately receiving the waste is most likely to be burdened with all
of the attendant responsibilities and costs. Consequently, exports
of hazardous waste to developing countries had become relatively
common practice by the mid-1980s.
Waste disposal law in most developing countries tends to be
significantly less onerous than that in industrialized countries,
and moreover, the authorities in developing countries generally
lack the means to effectively monitor compliance with any stan-
dards they impose.3 6 The transboundary trade in hazardous waste
has therefore presented developing nations with an untenable
choice: (1) accept the potentially damaging environmental im-
pact of legally importing hazardous waste in exchange for badly
needed capital, or (2) attempt to prevent the illegal importation
as well as the developing nation's limited means allow.
34. See F. James Handley, Hazardous Waste Exports: A Leak in the Sys-
tem of International Legal Controls, 19 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
10,171-72 (Apr. 1989). Demographic and geological factors have pre-
vented some industrialized countries from building adequate disposal
facilities and, as a result, their desire to export to developing countries
has increased. For example, Denmark, Greece and Luxembourg cannot
afford to build complex waste disposal sites due to their small size. The
volume of hazardous wastes are so considerable that such complex fa-
cilities are economically inefficient. Moreover, the Netherlands bans
landfills because of its geological and hydrological conditions, which in-
clude a high water table.
Id.
35. See KUMMER, supra note 19, at 43. This is also a position
adopted by UNEP at the Basel Conference. See id.
36. See ALEXANDRE Kiss AND DINAH SHELTON, INTERNATIONAL ENvI-
RONMENTAL LAW 320-21 (1991).
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The movement to alleviate this situation was sparked by a
number of widely-publicized incidents in the late 1980s involving
disastrous waste shipments to developing countries.37 Subse-
quently, many of the latter began seeking a total ban on all ex-
ports of hazardous waste to their countries. In May 1988, the
Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity
("OAU") adopted a resolution condemning the transfer of haz-
ardous and radioactive wastes to Africa as "a crime against Africa
and the African people. ' 38 Yet neither a total nor even a partial
ban can do more than oblige a governmental party to such an
agreement to withhold its consent to the importation of waste.
Even if the government of a developing nation officially halts
such shipments to its territory, it is often unable to enforce its
own injunction. For example, exporters and carriers can easily
mislabel shipments and bribe custons officers.3 9 Despite the in-
37. The most notable of these was the "Koko Incident" in 1988.
An Italian waste trader illegally arranged to dump 3,800 tons of toxic
wastes in a vacant lot in Koko, Nigeria. The Italian government was
obliged to recover the waste at its own expense due to the press atten-
tion and international opprobrium that arose from the incident. See
generally Liu, supra note 29. Another notable event was the equally-
publicized "Khian Sea" incident in 1986-87, in which a U.S. ship carry-
ing toxic ash was refused entry at numerous ports around the world,
changed its registry twice and eventually dumped the waste at sea. See
Liu, supra note 29, at 129-30; Okaru, supra note 23, at 157-58.
38. Organization of African Unity: Council of Ministers Resolution
on Dumping of Nuclear and Industrial Waste in Africa,
adopted May 23, 1988, 28 I.L.M. 567, 568 (1989).
39. See Liu, supra note 29, at 126. In addition, some multinational
corporations present comparable difficulties:
[F]oreign companies operating in developing countries usu-
ally insist on maintaining the secrecy of their production
processes, sometimes making it impossible for the developing
country to know how much and what kinds of solid wastes
have .already been deposited on their territory. It is hard to
imagine how developing countries can effectively regulate
pollution from solid wastes under such conditions.
Chen Lihu, On the Legal Regulation of Solid Wastes, reprinted in LESTER
Ross AND MITCHELL A. SILK, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY IN THE PEO-
PLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 153 (1987). One legitimate reason for such se-
crecy stated by industry representatives is reluctance to disclose too
much privileged information about their companies' processes that
might be obtained by competitors. See Law Controls Trade in Toxic Chemi-
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creased regulation of transboundary hazardous waste shipments,
the illicit trade is still so large that official statistics are generally
viewed as low approximations. 40 The demand for foreign disposal
of hazardous waste from industrialized nations is so great that it
is likely that an outright ban of the trade would simply increase
the use of these illicit channels. 41 For developing nations, there-
fore, fully implementing any kind of regulatory oversight upon
hazardous waste imports requires financial and technical assis-
tance from the industrialized world.
B. The Basel Convention
The Basel Convention is the first attempt at devising a global
mechanism to regulate the hazardous waste trade. Predictably,
the necessary compromises in the document's provisions have
made it controversial. In the opinion of many developing nations
and environmental groups, 42 the Convention's primary failing is
that it does not even propose to halt the transboundary trade in
hazardous waste; it simply attempts to regulate it. Moreover, al-
though UNEP officially describes the Basel Convention as "estab-
lish[ing] legally binding rules of law to control the trans-
boundary movements of hazardous wastes," 43 the essential thrust
of the Convention is not to restrict the trade. The Convention
entails a set of flexibly-defined norms and a legal protocol, with
cals, CHINA CHEMICAL REP., April 25, 1995, available in 1995 WL
13909056.
40. See Maureen T. Walsh, Comment, The Global Trade in Hazardous
Wastes: Domestic and International Attempts to Cope with a Growing Crisis in
Waste Management, 42 CATH. U. L. REv. 103, 108-09 (1992).
41. See Liu, supra note 29, at 151; Okaru, supra note 23, at 152.
42. See, e.g., Five More Countries Sign Basel Convention Just Before Dead-
line, Bringing Total to 54, 13 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 147 (Apr. 1990)
[hereinafter Five More Countries] "Environmentalists, Greenpeace in par-
ticular, have denounced the convention, saying it will do more to insti-
tutionalize waste trade than to prevent it. It 'merely legalizes illegal
traffic of waste and its implementation would create the illusion that
international waste trade is under control,' Greenpeace said." Id. at
148.
43. UNEP, Ministers Debate Amending Basel Convention to Ban Hazard-
ous Waste Exports to Non-OECD Countries (visited Nov. 24, 1996) <go-
pher://gopher.undp.org:70/00/ungophers/unep/newsreleases /1995/
nr_95-55>.
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a view toward eventually bringing a liability mechanism to bear on
those states that breach the protocol. 4 Pending the creation of
such a liability mechanism, the Convention serves less as a way of
preempting negotiations through the global imposition of legal
standards than as an inducement to more particularized negotia-
tions between states.
This is indicated first of all by the flexibility of the Conven-
tion's definitions. The definition of "hazardous waste" is a nota-
ble example. Substances considered potentially hazardous under
the Convention are contained in an annex listing specific chemi-
cals, such as cadmium and "[i] norganic cyanides, '' 45 and waste
stream categories, such as "[w]astes from the production, formu-
lation and use of biocides and phytopharmaceuticals. '' 46 In order
for a substance in this annex to be considered "hazardous"
under the Convention, the concentration must be sufficiently
great for the waste stream to possess any of a number of charac-
teristics, such as "Explosive" and "Corrosive," listed in a second
annex.47 The document, however, does not specifically quantify
the concentrations required to meet these threshold levels. 48 A
further illustration of the Convention's definitional flexibility is
44. See Basel Convention, supra note 1, art. 12. "The Parties shall
co-operate with a view to adopting, as soon as practicable, a protocol
setting out appropriate rules and procedures in the field of liability
and compensation for damage resulting from the transboundary move-
ment and disposal of hazardous wastes and other wastes." Id.
45. Id. at Annex I ("Categories of Wastes to Be Controlled: Wastes
having as constituents:")
46. Id. at Annex I ("Categories of Wastes to Be Controlled: Waste
Streams").
47. See id. at art. 1, § 1(a) & Annex III ("List of Hazardous
Characteristics").
48. One near exception may be found in the definition for "Flam-
mable liquids" under Annex III, which describes a "closed-cup" and
"open-cup test" for determining flammability, based on whether the
substance emits a flammable vapor at certain set temperatures. This rel-
ative precision is qualified in a parenthesis at the end, however: "Since
the results of open-cup tests and of closed-cup tests are not strictly
comparable and even individual results by the same test are often varia-
ble, regulations varying from the above figures to make allowance for such dif-
ferences would be within the spirit of this definition." Id. at Annex III (em-
phasis added).
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that waste not covered under the specific categories in the docu-
ment, but classified as hazardous by the domestic legislation of
any party-state directly involved in a particular transboundary
shipment of that waste, may also be considered hazardous under
the Convention.49
Even more broadly defined than "hazardous waste" is what
constitutes "environmentally sound" management of waste and
the "proper disposal" of hazardous waste by a receiving state.
Aside from the Convention's pronounced objective to "protect
human health and the environment, '"50 the task of determining
specific technical guidelines was deferred to subsequent meet-
ings.5' Although the Convention does not attempt to impose spe-
cific waste disposal standards any more precisely than it defines
standards of "hazardousness," the Convention does invite party-
states to impose additional requirements through domestic
legislation.52
The Convention also contains a provision, albeit loosely de-
fined, to ensure that wastes are managed in an "environmentally
sound manner." In light of the aforementioned "pollution
source transfer" issue that characterizes regulation of the hazard-
ous waste trade, it is significant that the Convention unequivo-
cally prohibits any party-state from abdicating its own obligation
49. See id. at art. 1, § l(b) & Annex III ("Tests") "The potential
hazards posed by certain types of wastes are not yet fully docu-
mented .. .Many countries have developed national tests which can
be applied to materials listed in Annex I, in order to decide if these
materials exhibit any of the characteristics listed in this Annex." Id.; see
also Okaru, supra note 23, at 147 (suggesting that a uniform environ-
mental standard might not be practical due to the differences in cost
for industrialized and developing countries, but that effective environ-
mental standards applied on a case-by-case basis could be based on a
global "threshold" established by the Convention).
50. See Basel Convention, supra note 1, art. 4, § 11.
51. See id. at art. 4, § 8; but see 138 CONG. REc. S12,292-93 (1992)
(Remarks by Sen. Claiborne Pell) [hereinafter Pell remarks] (indicating
that the "understanding" of the U.S. government vis-A-vis Article
4(9) (a), allowing export only if State of export lacks its own "suitable
disposal sites," would include relative cost of disposal in either State as
part of the calculation of "suitability").
52. See Basel Convention, supra note 1, art. 4, § 11.
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by simply transferring the pollution source to another state.5 3 In
short, if liability had been specifically imposed by the Conven-
tion, the mere acceptance of hazardous waste by a transit or re-
ceiving state would not render a sending state immune from lia-
bility if environmental damage were to result from the improper
management of the waste by a transit state or improper manage-
ment and disposal by the receiving state. Receiving states, in ef-
fect, would not be viewed as having assumed the risk in ac-
cepting a shipment of waste that the sending state knew or had
reason to know that the receiving state could not properly
handle.
Thus, the limited duties imposed on party-states by the Con-
vention are formally appropriate, despite the absence of a spe-
cific liability protocol. As such, the central functional aspect of
the Convention is its "notice and consent" procedure. This pro-
cedure was supported by industrialized nations, particularly the
United States, as a practical alternative to a total ban on trans-
boundary shipments of hazardous waste.5 4 States from which
waste generators intend to export must provide the governments
of the destination state and any transit states with a written "No-
tice Statement" indicating the type, quantity and packaging of
the waste, the nature of its generation, and the planned method
of its disposal. 55 The notice statement must also indicate the rele-
vant private parties (generator and exporter in sending state, car-
riers, disposer in receiving state), and relevant government au-
thorities in each state. 56 In addition, the provision contains a
curiously-worded requirement that the notice statement include:
[i]nformation transmitted . . . to the exporter or generator
from the disposer of the waste upon which the latter has based
his assessment that there was no reason to believe that the
wastes will not be managed in an environmentally sound man-
ner in accordance with the laws and regulations of the country
53. See id. at art. 4, § 10. "The obligation under this Convention of
States in which hazardous wastes and other wastes are generated to re-
quire that those wastes are managed in an environmentally sound man-
ner may not under any circumstances be transferred to the States of
import or transit." Id.
54. See id. at art. 6; see also Okaru, supra note 23, at 154.
55. See Basel Convention, supra note 1, Annex V A.
56. See id.
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of import.57
Despite its equivocal wording, this provision is most relevant to
the putative liability of a sending state for environmental dam-
age. The provision establishes, at the very least, a rudimentary
standard for governments in monitoring the hazardous waste
trade and making disclosures to other concerned governments.5 8
One aspect of the "notice and consent" mechanism that has
occasioned some criticism is the "consent" requirement. A na-
tion importing a shipment of waste, as well as all "transit" na-
tions through which the waste is to pass, must provide written
consent to the shipment before the state of export may allow the
waste to be exported.5 9 If the shipment cannot be completed
under the authorized terms or within the provisions of the Con-
vention, however, the state of export must re-import the shipment
unless an alternative arrangement for proper disposal can be
made within ninety days of notification by the state of import.60
Thus even in a situation where a state of import has legally con-
sented to receive a shipment, by the terms of the Convention,
the state of export remains responsible for the waste up until its
disposal, and may be entirely liable for costs if fulfillment of the
contract becomes impossible. 6' This re-importation obligation im-
posed on exporting states is the only substantive remedy pre-
57. Id. at Annex V A, § 20.
58. That the Convention does not do a great deal more than this
occasions much of the criticism from environmental groups. See Five
More Countries, supra note 42, at 148. "Environmentalists . . . argue that
'mere notification systems are an ineffective means of controlling the
international waste trade.' A notification system merely sets up a track-
ing system for the wastes, [stated] Ann Leonard of Greenpeace." Id.
59. See Basel Convention, supra note 1, art. 6, §§ 2-4. Under sec-
tion 4, a state of transit may waive prior written consent. Thus if it does
not object to a shipment within 60 days of receiving notice, the state of
export may allow the shipment to proceed through the state of transit.
See id.
60. See id. at art. 8.
61. See Hao-Nhien Q. Vu, The Law of Treaties and the Export of Haz-
ardous Waste, 12 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 389, 420 (1994); but see
Okaru, supra note 23, at 157 (arguing that strict liability for exporting
states, even in this limited sense, would be the most practical liability
scheme because it would oblige states of export to "police their shores
more carefully").
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scribed by the Convention.62
By far the most controversial aspect of the Basel Convention is
the apparent contradiction between two particular provisions of
the document. Article 4, which details the General Obligations of
Party States, includes the unequivocal stipulation that party states
"shall not" allow any import or export of hazardous waste from
or to any non-party state. 63 This provision, referred to generally
as the "limited ban," was intended not only to discourage parties
from trading with states that were not willing or able to meet the
basic standards of the Convention, but also to oblige non-party
states to become parties. 64 This provision was the product of
compromise between OECD nations and developing nations, as
many of the latter strongly favored a total ban on the trans-
boundary hazardous waste trade.65
This compromise was complicated, and perhaps undone, by
the inclusion of another provision authorizing party-states to
enter into bilateral and multilateral agreements with party and
non-party states alike, provided that the stipulations in such
agreements would not be "less environmentally sound" than the
standards set forth in the Convention. 66 This measure was
strongly urged by many OECD nations wishing to offset the stric-
tures of the Convention's waste classification system.67 Its ostensi-
ble advantage of this is its implicit "ratcheting" effect: nudging
collective environmental standards upward through piecemeal bi-
and multi-lateral agreements.
The inclusion of this provision, and its seeming derogation
from the "limited ban" on trade between party and non-party-
62. See Basel Convention, supra note 1, art. 9, § 1 (defining illegal
traffic as a transboundary movement of hazardous waste occurring
without notification and/or consent or through fraudulently obtained
consent) & art. 9, § 2 (obligating the state of export to ensure that ille-
gal shipments are either re-imported by the exporter or the state of ex-
port, or, if re-importation is impractical, are properly disposed).
63. See id. at art. 4, § 5. "A Party shall not permit hazardous waste
or other wastes to be exported to a non-Party or to be imported from a
non-Party." Id.
64. See KUMMER, supra note 19, at 61-62.
65. See id. at 43. This position was also strongly supported by ob-
serving representatives of non-governmental organizations, notably
Greenpeace. See id. at n.17.
66. See Basel Convention, supra note 1, art. 11, § 1.
67. See KUMMER, supra note 19, at 43.
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states, caused every member of the OAU except Nigeria, to ini-
tially refuse to sign the final Convention document.68 In contrast,
a number of key industrial states, like Germany, the United
States, the United Kingdom and Japan, briefly deferred their sig-
natures because they found the final document's provisions
overly strict, despite the numerous compromises in place. 69
C. Subsequent Agreements
Despite its apparent limitations, the Basel Convention specifi-
cally affirms the right of any state to prohibit the import of haz-
ardous wastes into its territory.V0 Appropriately, one initial conse-
quence of the Convention was the subsequent negotiation of
separate regional agreements banning all imports of hazardous
wastes to developing nations in specific regions. Most notable
among these are the Fourth ACP-EEC Convention of Lome
("Lom6 IV"),"1 the Central American Regional Agreement on
the Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes ("Panama
City"), 72 and the Bamako Convention on the Ban of the Import
68. See Treaty Limping Into Effect, supra note 2. Nigeria's reticence in
joining with the OAU members is ironic in light of the fact that it re-
acted to the Koko incident by making the import of hazardous waste a
capital offense. See Liu, supra note 29, at 132; Vu, supra note 61, at 390.
The OAU members refrained from signing only until the organization
could formulate a collective position. See Liu, supra note 29, at 144. A
number of African states reconsidered the Basel Convention and rati-
fied it after the negotiation of the Bamako Convention. As of Jan. 13,
1997, the following OAU members were parties to the Basel Conven-
tion: Burundi, Comoros, Cote d'Ivoire, Egypt, Guinea, Malawi,
Maldives, Mauritania, Mauritius, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, Seychelles,
South Africa, Tanzania, Tunisia, Zaire and Zambia. See Basel Status,
supra note 4; Organisation of African Unity (OAU): Membership (vis-
ited Mar. 16, 1997) <http://www.rapide-pana.com/demo/oua/
APOUAO1 .HTM#MEMBERSHIP>.
69. See KUMMER, supra note 19, at 45. Germany, Japan and the
United Kingdom have all since ratified the Convention, however. See
Basel Status, supra note 4.
70. See Basel Convention, supra note 1, art. 4, § 1.
71. Fourth Convention of Lom6 (Lom6 IV), Dec. 15, 1989, ACP-
EEC, 1992 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 47, 29 I.L.M. 783 [hereinafter Lom6 IV].
72. Acuerdo Regional Sobre Movimiento Transfrontiero de
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Into Africa and the Control of Transboundary Movement of Haz-
ardous Wastes Within Africa ("Bamako Convention"). 73 Article 39
of Lom6 IV, to which the nations of the EU and nations of the
ACP (Africa, Caribbean and Pacific) are parties, prohibits export
of both hazardous and radioactive wastes from EU countries to
any of the ACP countries. 74
The Bamako Convention, which followed in the wake of Lom6
IV, is a prime example of the way in which the Basel Convention
may serve as an incentive for particularized substantive regula-
tion, rather than merely as a compromised attempt to impose it
globally.75 The Bamako Convention was negotiated by the mem-
bers of the OAU and enacted in January, 1991, shortly before
the Basel Convention went into effect.7 6 The Bamako Convention
mirrors the Basel Convention in numerous particulars, but it
contains one very prominent difference: a ban on all exports of
hazardous waste to all signatory African countries, even if a fel-
low OAU state is the exporter.77 The Bamako Convention was
conceived as a means of rectifying certain perceived weaknesses
of the Basel Convention. Specifically, the Basel Convention's
loopholes seemed to compromise the ability of developing na-
tions to restrict imports of hazardous waste. Interestingly, the
Bamako Convention cites the Basel Convention's provision al-
lowing for separate agreements78 as justification for establishing a
Desechos Peligrosos [Central American Regional Agreement on the
Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes], Dec. 9-11, 1992, U.N.
Doc. UNEP/CHW/C.l/INF.2 (Oct. 1993), available in 3 YB. INT'L
ENVTL. L., 1992, Doc. No. 10 (Appended Disk, Gunther Handl et al.
eds., 1992) [hereinafter Panama City Agreement] (banning all export
of hazardous waste to Central American states).
73. Bamako Convention on the Ban of the Import into Africa and
the Control of Transboundary Movement and Management of Hazard-
ous Wastes within Africa, Jan. 29, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 773 (1991) [hereinafter
Bamako Convention].
74. See Lom6 IV, supra note 71.
75. See KUMMER, supra note 19, at 104-05.
76. See Bamako Convention, supra note 73.
77. See id.
78. See Basel Convention, supra note 1, art. 11, § 1. "Parties may
enter into bilateral, multilateral, or regional agreements . . .provided
that .... [t]hese agreements or arrangements shall stipulate provisions
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regional agreement "equal to or stronger than" the Basel Con-
vention's provisions.7 9 In light of the suddenly evident utility of
the Basel Convention's reciprocity provision as a baseline for
more stringent subsequent agreements such as the Bamako Con-
vention, a number of African states that initially refused to sign
the Basel Convention have now done so. 0
Subsequent revisions of the Basel Convention itself, however,
have been extremely divisive. At the Second Meeting of the Con-
ference of the Parties to the Basel Convention (Second Confer-
ence) on March 25, 1994, party states resolved to impose an im-
mediate ban on all transfers of hazardous waste between OECD
countries and non-OECD countries. 81 The party-states also de-
cided to phase out transfers of waste for recycling by December
31, 1997,82 and this decision was later amended to the Conven-
tion at the Third Meeting of the Conference of Parties to the Ba-
sel Convention in 1995 (Third Conference). 83 However, the ban's
practical effect is still contingent on the further revision of the
Convention's definitions of hazardous waste.84
Reactions from most OECD nations were predictably hostile. 85
which are not less environmentally sound than those provided for by
this Convention." Id.
79. See Bamako Convention, supra note 73, Preamble & § 11.
80. See KUMMER, supra note 19, at 105. Ironically, more African
states have now ratified the Basel Convention than the Bamako Con-
vention, although neither number is large. See id.
81. See Decisions Adopted by the Second Meeting of the Confer-
ence of the Parties in Geneva, Switzerland on 25 March 1994 (visited
Mar. 16, 1997) <http://www.unep.ch/sbc/cop-2.html> [hereinafter Sec-
ond Conference] (Decision 11/12).
82. See id.
83. See Decisions Adopted by the Third Meeting of the Conference
of the Parties to the Basel Convention in Geneva, 18-22 September
1995 (visited Mar. 16, 1997) <http://www.unep.ch/sbc/cop3-b.html>
(Decisions 111/1 [amending the Convention] & 111/12 [instructing the
Technical Working Group to "continue work on criteria for hazardous
characteristics]).
84. See id.
85. The Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Norway and Swe-
den) forwarded the proposal and are thus, obviously, exceptions. See
Basel Convention Ban on OECD Exports Hinges on Definition of Recycled
Waste, Int'l Envtl. Daily (BNA), at d3 (Sept. 20, 1995) [hereinafter Ban
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The United States, notably, has failed to complete its long-prom-
ised ratification of the Convention and has cited the OECD ban
adopted at the Second Conference as a primary obstacle to U.S.
ratification. 86 Furthermore, the government of Australia has
claimed that it does not acknoivledge any specific legal obliga-
tion arising from the Convention. It only acknowledges the moral
obligation incumbent on all nations to bring the transboundary
trade in hazardous waste "under control. 87
II. THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA
A. The United States and the Basel Convention
Although the United States representatives initially hesitated to
sign the Basel Convention at the time of its completion, the U.S.
was nevertheless one of the first nations to sign the document. 8
The U.S. government has certainly never opposed the Conven-
tion's fundamental objectives. A number of legislators and gov-
ernment officials have long pointed out that it would be advanta-
geous for the U.S., from an overall foreign policy standpoint, to
be on the right side of the "moral" issue of industrialized na-
on OECD Exports].
86. See infra text accompanying notes 111-114.
87. See Kalinga Seneviratne, Australia-Environment: An Export Nobody
Wants, Inter Press Serv., Oct. 21, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Inpres File.
Chris Lamb, legal adviser to the Australian Department of
Foreign Affairs and Trade, argues that while the Basel Con-
vention carries a lot of political and moral weight, it does
not create any particular legal obligation for Australia.
"What the countries decided they wanted to do at the
Basel conference was to create an atmosphere in which all
countries in the world agreed that the vulnerable needed to
be protected, and the vulnerable were described, for the pur-
pose of that decision, as being the non-member states of the
OECD," he says.
He adds: "What needs to happen now is that countries
in the period between now and the end of 1997 have to
work out exactly how they propose to implement it."
Id.
88. See Basel Status, supra note 4.
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tions exporting waste to developing ones. 89 In fact, Congressional
efforts to implement the Convention began even before the ini-
tial document was finalized. 90
The Basel Convention, however, is not a self-executing treaty.
In order for the United States to become a full participant, Con-
gress must enact implementing legislation which brings domestic
hazardous waste law into line with the standards of the Conven-
tion. United States law governing hazardous waste disposal is
contained in the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
("RCRA"). 91 Originally enacted in 1976, RCRA established fed-
eral authority over hazardous waste traffic and standards for dis-
posal within the U.S. There was no RCRA provision pertaining to
the export of hazardous waste until 1984, when Congress enacted
the Hazardous and Solid Wastes Amendments ("HSWA"). 92
These amendments established a "prior informed consent" pro-
cedure for exports of waste which requires (1) notification of
both EPA and the state of import and (2) consent from the state
of import.93 There is, however, no re-importation requirement
89. See Thomas R. Mounteer, Codifying Basel Convention Obligations
into U.S. Law: The Waste Export Control Act, 21 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L.
Inst.) 10085, n.57 (Feb. 1991) (quoting International Export of U.S. Waste:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Environment, Energy, and Natural Resources
of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 100th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1988), at 257-58). Assistant Secretary of State Bernthal testified that:
[m]any countries, particularly developing countries, do not
make the sometimes arcane distinction made under RCRA
between hazardous and nonhazardous waste. Second, many
countries will hold the U.S. Government responsible for
problems caused by private U.S. firms. Thirdly, the United
States will be held morally responsible for any damage
caused by waste, whether it is hazardous or not, generated by
U.S. companies and disposed of in an underdeveloped coun-
try, regardless of whether or not the government of the
country consented to receiving the waste.
Id.
90. See Mounteer, supra note 89 (text accompanying n.5).
91. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-87 (1994).
92. 42 U.S.C. § 6938; RCRA § 3017 (1994).
93. See Rebecca A. Kirby, The Basel Convention and the Need for
United States Implementation, 24 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 281, 294 (1994).
19971
326 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. VIII
for shipments refused by a state of import.94
RCRA also does not accord EPA sufficient authority to halt a
waste export shipment consented to, even when the agency has
reason to believe that the waste will not be managed in an envi-
ronmentally sound manner.95 In order for EPA to function prop-
erly under the Convention, implementing legislation would be
required not only to delegate the necessary authority to EPA, but
also to set the requisite standards for "environmentally sound"
disposal by a foreign waste importer.96 Additionally, as EPA would
theoretically be accorded authority both to halt unlawful acts
and to appraise disposal facilities outside of the jurisdiction of
the U.S., the extraterritorial reach of RCRA would also have to
be precisely delineated.
Disagreements over what specific standards should be imposed
under RCRA have caused a great deal of delay in implementing
the Convention.97 Legislation has been proposed in numerous
permutations and varying degrees of strictness, but none has as
yet been enacted.98 Unfortunately, this delay has placed U.S. rati-
fication of the Convention in jeopardy and, currently, the pro-
cess is at a standstill. 99 Paradoxically, the obstacles to implementa-
94. See Hazardous Waste: Mishandled Exports Would Be Returned to U.S.
Under Administration's New Policy, Daily Envtl. Rep. (BNA), at dl0 (Mar.
2, 1994) [hereinafter Mishandled Exports].
95. See Mounteer, supra note 89 (text accompanying nn.66-69).
96. See id.
97. See Treaty Limping Into Effect, supra note 2.
98. See Kirby, supra note 93, at 304 n.96 (listing eleven bills intro-
duced in the House and Senate between 1989 and 1994, either fully im-
plementing the Basel Convention or bringing federal environmental
law significantly into line with the Convention's requirements). All of
these bills have languished in committee and have never been put to a
vote. See Liu, supra note 29, at 140.
99. The U.S. officially supports the Convention, but has voiced
strong reservations over the inclusion of waste for recycling within the
definition of hazardous waste in the amendment to the Convention
drawn up at the Second Conference. The U.S. government has stated
that this definition must be re-negotiated before the U.S. can ratify the
Convention. See Paige Bowers, Definition of Waste Remains Stumbling
Block; Amendment Targeted by U.S. Groups, WASHINGTON TIMES, Dec. 9,
1996, at A14, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wtimes File.
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tion now arise from what had previously been the government's
primary rationales for ratification.
At the time of the Senate vote consenting to ratification on
August 11, 1992,100 the Bush administration posited two prag-
matic rationales for implementing the Convention as rapidly as
possible. First, lack of party status for the U S. would mean the
automatic disruption of existing export arrangements with states
that were parties to the Convention, but with whom the U.S. did
not currently have a separate bilateral agreement governing
waste exports. 1 1 The only treaties of this nature, existing then
and now, are those with the United States' immediate neighbors,
Canada'0 2 and Mexico, 10 3 and another with the OECD countries
which covers only the export of waste for recycling purposes.0 4 A
number of key terms in the Canadian and Mexican bilateral trea-
ties are actually more stringent than their counterparts in U.S.
environmental law and in the Basel Convention itself.05 Second,
100. See 138 CONG. REc. S12,292 (1992). The Senate's consent to
ratification constituted that body's assent to the signature. Full ratifica-
tion would still require enacting legislation. See id.
101. See id. at S12,293 (Letter from Janet Mullins, Assistant Secre-
tary of State for Legislative Affairs, to Hon. Claiborne Pell, Chairman,
Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate (July 24, 1992) [hereinaf-
ter Mullins Letter] (citing, as a prime example, an agreement with Fin-
land allowing for the disposal of dioxins from the U.S. in a special in-
cinerator. As export of this waste was not for recycling purposes, there
was no recourse to the OECD treaty).
102. Agreement Between the Government of the United States of
America and the Government of Canada Concerning the Trans-
boundary Movement of Hazardous Waste, Oct. 28, 1986, T.I.A.S. No.
11099 [hereinafter U.S.-Canada Agreement].
103. Agreement of Co-operation Between the United States of
America and the United Mexican States Regarding the Transboundary
Shipments of Hazardous Wastes and Hazardous Substances, Nov. 12,
1986, T.I.A.S. No. 11269 [hereinafter U.S.-Mexico Agreement].
104. OECD Council Decision Concerning the Control of Trans-
frontier Movements of Wastes Destined for Recovery Operations, done
Mar. 30, 1992, T.I.S. No. 11880, OECD Doc. No. C(92)39/final.
105. See U.S.-Canada Agreement, supra note 102, art. 4 (requiring
notification of designated authorities in transit countries, a require-
ment lacking in the export provisions of RCRA § 6938); U.S.-Mexico
Agreement, supra note 103, art. XIV, § 2 (requiring not only reimporta-
tion of hazardous waste by the state of export, but also direct compen-
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party status for the U.S. would enable it to participate fully at the
subsequent conferences, mandated by the Convention, since the
terms of the Convention are likely to be extensively revised. 10 6
Political wrangling between the Bush administration and Demo-
cratic members of Congress, who sought to force the administra-
tion to support reauthorization of domestic environmental law in
its entirety rather than piecemeal, precluded implementation
during the Bush administration. 17
In his first term, President Clinton proposed speedy imple-
mentation of the Basel Convention as a component of a scaled-
down RCRA reauthorization bill. 08 In March of 1994, the Clinton
administration announced new legislation that would impose a
re-import obligation on domestic waste exporters corresponding
with the analogous provision in the Convention. 10 9 Unfortunately,
the administration's announcement was untimely. It coincided
with the Second Conference of the Basel Convention, at which
the party-states resolved to enact a ban on all waste shipments
between OECD and non-OECD states. 10
The U.S. Department of Commerce responded to the Second
Conference by publicly withdrawing its support for implementa-
tion of the Basel Convention.' The Department also voiced ob-
jections to the party-states' pledge in the same resolution to ban
all transboundary waste exports, including those for recycling
purposes, by the end of 1997.112 It suggested that the only viable
sation for "damages caused to persons, property or the environment").
106. See Mullins Letter, supra note 101. This was also the position
of the United States Council on International Business. See Treaty Limp-
ing Into Effect, supra note 2.
107. See Treaty Limping Into Effect, supra note 2.
108. See EPA: Agency Official Discusses Cabinet Bill, Other Upcoming
Legislative Agenda Items, Daily Env't. Rep. (BNA), at d3 (Oct. 8, 1993).
109. See Mishandled Exports, supra note 94; Louis Freedberg, U.S.
Plans Ban on Export of Toxic Waste, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 26, 1994, at A4,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Sfchrn File; see also Basel Convention,
supra note 1, art. 8.
110. See Second Conference, supra note 81.
111. See Hazardous Waste: U.S. Chamber of Commerce Halts Support of
Basel Treaty Citing Ban on Waste Trade, Daily Env't. Rep. (BNA), at d16
(May 19, 1994) [hereinafter Commerce Halts Support].
112. See Second Conference, supra note 81.
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diplomatic option for the U.S. government was for the State De-
partment to place those states with whom the U.S. had informal
waste export agreements on notice that these agreements would
become inoperative if the latest Convention revisions were en-
acted, and then to begin negotiating new bilateral treaties from
scratch. 113
The State Department currently maintains that, in practice,
the U.S. adheres to the Basel Convention in its entirety. Mean-
while, it has simultaneously sought to persuade the party-states to
modify the broad definition of hazardous waste in the amend-
ment.' 14 As it stands now, the United States' non-party status
places it in a very difficult position. Without ratification, the ne-
gotiation of separate agreements with party-states is essential.
The viability of the existing treaties with Canada and Mexico is at
risk, as well." 5 The Convention, however, prohibits party-states
from entering into any separate agreements that are "less envi-
ronmentally sound" than the provisions of the Basel Conven-
tion. 116 Thus in order for the U.S. to negotiate any agreement
with a party-state, the U.S. is still obliged to implement the same
domestic legislation required for ratification of the Convention
itself.
It is ironic that while many developing countries initially con-
sidered the standards of the Basel Convention overly lax, those
same standards have been sufficient to curtail the options of the
world's largest industrial power. Even if the U.S. does not imple-
ment the Basel Convention, it must still enact domestic measures
equivalent to implementation in order to provide for the legal
disposal of its wastes abroad. Increased exports of waste through
113. See Commerce Halts Support, supra note 111.
114. See Ban on OECD Exports, supra note 85; Bowers, supra note 99.
115. See Mounteer, supra note 89 (text accompanying nn.171-72).
Ironically, the non-party status of the U.S. does not prevent it from ne-
gotiating bilateral agreements with party-states for the export of hazard-
ous wastes to the U.S. for disposal in this country, and the government
has already done so with Malaysia. See Agreement Between the Govern-
ment of the United States of America and the Government of Malaysia
Concerning the Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes from
Malaysia to the United States, Mar. 10, 1995, Temp. State Dept. No. 95-
79.
116. See Mullins Letter, supra note 101.
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illicit channels would simply expose the U.S. to more of the
same moral opprobrium that implementation might have damp-
ened. Most significantly, however, the United States' failure to
implement the Convention deprives it of both influence on the
course that international waste policy may take in the future and,
also, influence on hazardous waste policies pursued by other na-
tions, such as China.
B. China and Environmental Law
China is, in terms of living standards and per capita income,
the world's largest developing nation.1 7 Not coincidentally, it is
on of the only developing nations in a position to negotiate at
reasonable parity with industrialized nations, including the
United States. As such, the exceptional case of China might ap-
pear to overwhelm those mechanisms within the Convention de-
signed to ameliorate the differences between industrialized and
developing nations.
China, however, is subject to the same pressures as other de-
veloping nations in resisting ostensibly unwanted imports of haz-
ardous waste. The problem has become increasingly acute in re-
cent years, throughout Asia. China, in particular, has become a
primary destination for transboundary hazardous wasteI18 in the
wake of import bans imposed by the 0AU119 and Latin American
countries. 120 Moreover, China's vulnerability to imports of hazard-
117. See generally Environmental Protection in China, Xinhua News
Agency, June 4, 1996, Item No: 0604038, available in LEXIS, News Li-
brary, Xinhua File; see also comments by Deputy Division Chief, Inter-
national Liaison Dept., China Law Society, P.R.C., Huanhui Xue, Sus-
tainable Development: Accommodating Environmental and Economic Needs, in
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION IN PACIFIC RIM NATIONS 117-18 (Randall
Abate and Elissa C. Lichtenstein, eds., 1993).
118. See Greenpeace Report, supra note 10, at 113. "[Greenpeace haz-
ardous waste campaigner Simon Divecha] added that over 103 coun-
tries had banned the import of hazardous waste, but only one of those
was in Asia - the Philippines. Even with the ban, waste is still being
shipped to the Philippines, he said."
Id.
119. See Bamako Convention, supra note 73; see also Lom6 IV, supra
note 71, art. 39.
120. See Panama City Agreement, supra note 72.
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ous waste has been compounded by years of relatively unbridled
industrial development and lax enforcement of industrial emis-
sion standards.' Consequently, China's domestic environmental
situation is, by many accounts, extremely serious. 12 Despite the
government's strict control of all kinds of information, Chinese
environmental conditions have already occasioned grim reports
of such phenomena as an entire city disappearing from satellite
photographs under its own smog, 23 thousands of miles of lifeless
waterways, 124 and a soaring rate of death from pollution-related
causes. 125
The chronology of China's statutory enactments regarding the
environment coincide with China's drive to develop its econ-
omy. 126 China's National Environmental Protection Agency
("PRC-NEPA") was established by the enactment of the Environ-
121. See Craig S. Smith, China Becomes Dump Site For the World's Gar-
bage, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Oct. 4, 1995, available in LEXIS, News library,
Aws File.
122. See Ichiro Kato, Introduction: Environmental Laws in Southeast
Asia and China: An Overview, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAw AND POLICY IN THE
PACIFIC BASIN AREA 4-5 (Ichiro Kato, Nobuo Kumamoto and William H.
Matthews, eds., 1981).
123. The city was Benxi, in the heavily industrialized northern re-
gion. See China: Strategy for Sustainable Development to Trigger New Govern-
mental Policies, 15 Int'l Envt Rep. (BNA) 650, 651 (Oct. 7, 1992) [here-
inafter China Strategy].
124. China: Environment Protection Not Keeping Pace with Economic
Growth, Government Reports, 16 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 449 (June 16,
1993) [hereinafter Protection Not Keeping Pace].
[China's NEPA reported that] 80 percent of river sections run-
ning through cities are now polluted, with nearly 86 percent ex-
ceeding prescribed standards in at least one measure. Fish were
"basically extinct" in 2,800 kilometers (1,736 miles) of the river
sections surveyed, and 25,000 kilometers (15,500 miles) of river
sections failed to meet fishery standards, the report said.
Id.
125. See China: Public Health Ministry Says Pollution Leading Cause of
Illness, Death in China, 19 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 331 (Apr. 17, 1996); see
also Agnes Cheung, China: Environment Fear 'May Spark Mass Exodus', S.
CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 1, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Schina File.
126. See Environmental Protection in China, supra note 117.
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mental Protection Act in 1979.127 Although the statute was more
a statement of principles than substantive environmental regula-
tion, PRC-NEPA was authorized to set domestic environmental
standards and draft appropriate regulations. 128 Additionally, the
various municipal, provincial and autonomous regional govern-
ments would have their own environmental protection bureaus
under the general supervision of PRC-NEPA. 129 These environ-
mental agencies were given nominal enforcement powers under
the 1979 Act, 130 but their powers were more clearly defined, and
thus extended, in the major subsequent enactments of the 1980s,
most notably the Water Pollution Control Act (1984)131 and the
Air Pollution Control Act (1988).132 The monitoring and enforce-
ment capability of the environmental agencies was more thor-
oughly codified in the Environmental Protection Law of 1989,
127. Environmental Protection Law of the People's Republic of
China (Adopted in Principle atthe llth Meeting of the Standing Com-
mittee of the Fifth National People's Congress on Sept. 13, 1979), Law
790913 [hereinafter PRC Environmental Law of 1979], in I STATUTES
AND REGULATIONS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA [hereinafter PRC
STATUTES] (1987).
128. See id. at ch. 4, art. 26.
129. See id. at ch. 4, art. 27; see also Michael Roberts, Environment:
Industry Faces Registration Law (Foreign Chemical Companies are Starting to
Deal with China's New Environmental Regulations), 157 CHEMICAL WI-, No.
8 (Sept. 6, 1995), available in LEXIS, Envirn Library, Chemwk File.
130. See PRC Environmental Protection Law of 1979, supra note
127, ch. 6, art. 32. The environmental protection agencies at the na-
tional and provincial levels are given nominal power to "criticize,"
warn, fine, enjoin or assess damages from "[ulnits which have violated
this law and other environmental protection regulations . . . subject to
the approval of the people's government of the corresponding level" (emphasis
added). Id.
131. Law of the PRC on the Prevention of Water Pollution and
Treatment of Polluted Water (Adopted by the Standing Committee of
the' 'Sixth National People's Congress at its Fifth Session on 11 May
1984 and Promulgated on the same day), Law 840511 in II PRC STAT-
UTES (1987).
132. Law of the PRC on Atmospheric Pollution Control (Adopted
by the Standing Committee of the Sixth National People's Congress on
5 Sept. 1987), Law 870905.1, ch. 5, arts. 31-34 in IV PRC STATUTES
(1989) (as in Water Pollution Control Act, giving agencies explicit au-
thority to determine penalties).
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which introduced a polluter-registration and licensing system.133
A pledge to protect the environment was also formally included
in China's 1989 Constitution.13 4
Toxic waste regulation was one of the last major environmental
issues to be addressed by the Chinese government, partially due
to intra-governmental friction between PRC-NEPA, the People's
Congress, and the Ministry of Chemical Industries. 135 Officially,
the government had two major concerns: (1) the desirability of
obtaining substantial foreign financial and technical assistance in
improving China's disposal and recycling capabilities, and (2) the
need to avoid disrupting China's economic development.1 36 The
Chinese government has given mixed signals on the issue of for-
eign environmental aid. The indications are strong that the Chi-
nese environmental situation is beyond that country's means to
rectify without considerable outside assistance, yet officials have
also indicated that the government's willingness to address it may
be predicated to some degree on the promise of such
assistance. 137
133. Law of the PRC on Environmental Protection (Adopted at
the llth Session of the Standing Committee of the Seventh National
People's Congress on 26 Dec., 1989), Law 891226.2, ch. IV, arts. 27-29
in VI PRC STATUTES (1990).
134. See Constitution of the People's Republic of China, Adopted
by the 5th Session of the 5th National People's Congress, Dec. 4, 1989,
Law No. 821204, art. 26, in 1 PRC STATUTES, supra note 127 (1987)
"The State is to protect and improve the living and ecological environ-
ment and to control pollution and other public hazards". Id.
135. See generally Roberts, supra note 129.
136. See China: New Laws to be Developed to Curb Solid Waste, Control
River Pollution, 14 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 360 (1991). In 1994, however,
the Chinese government officially took notice of the significant losses
to the economy due to pollution, totaling 100 billion yuan (U.S. $11.5
billion), "due to health problems, resource wastage, and destruction of
ecological systems." See China: Economy Suffers $11.5 Billion Loss Annually
.Due to Environmental Pollution, 17 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 265 (1994); see
also Huanhui comments, supra note 117, at 118.
137. See China to Push for Economic Aid for Pollution Control at Rio
Meeting, 15 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 306 (1992). "When asked if China
would agree to curbs on pollutant emissions in exchange for aid from
the developed world at Rio, [Man Fuliang, vice director of the Environ-
mental Protection Agency for China's Heilongjiang Province] said
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China ratified the Basel Convention on December 17, 1991,
and became a full party-state on May 5, 1992.138 Having already
enacted a provisional ban on imports of non-recyclable hazard-
ous waste in 1991,139 China was a leading proponent of the total
ban on the movement of all hazardous waste between OECD and
developing countries introduced at the Second Conference of
the Basel Convention in March, 1994.140 Shortly thereafter, the
government adopted the first comprehensive waste statute, spe-
cifically addressing toxic chemicals: Regulations on Environmen-
tal Management Registration of the First Import of Chemicals
and Import and Export of Toxic Chemicals.141 A detailed regula-
tory scheme and the establishment of a supervisory State Com-
mittee for Evaluation of Toxic Chemicals followed in February,
1995. 142
The regulations have two basic components: (1) an official
classification of toxic substances, and (2) requirements that both
foreign generators intending to export waste to China as well as
those Chinese entities wishing to import it, apply for registration
China would take an "active attitude" toward any funds it receives." Id.
138. See Basel Status, supra note 4; see also Basel Convention, supra
note 1, art. 25, para. 2. Convention enters into force for a state ninety
days after ratification. See id.
139. See Government to Step Up Inspections, supra note 9.
140. See Frank McDonald, Ban on Toxic Waste Going to Poorest Coun-
tries is Welcomed, IRISH TIMES, Mar. 26, 1994, at 7, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Itimes File. "Greenpeace International, which staged a
sustained lobbying campaign for the ban credited Denmark, China and
the Group of 77, led by Sri Lanka, with forcing the issue to a conclu-
sion this week." Id. See also supra note 81.
141. See Administration of the Environment in Connection with
the Import of Chemicals for the First Time and for the Import and Ex-
port of Toxic Chemicals Provisions, May 1, 1994, Law No. 940501, sum-
marized in 5 CHINA LAw REFERENCE SERVICE (1996); see also Chinese Regu-
lation Faces Criticism: Chemical Import & Export Registration Criticized by
Western Firms as Costly & Confusing, EUROPEAN CHEMICAL NEws, July 3,
1995.
142. See Will Chinese Chemical Import Control Constitute Trade Barrier?,
JAPAN CHEMICAL WI-, Apr. 13, 1995, available in 1995 WL 10281991; Law
Controls Trade in Toxic Chemicals, CHINA CHEMICAL REP., Apr. 25, 1995,
available in 1995 WL 13909056.
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with NEPA and pay the appropriate registration fees. 43 NEPA has
stated publicly that the new regulations would be enforced ini-
tially against multinational corporations importing chemicals into
China, and would be subsequently brought to bear against Chi-
nese companies in conjunction with prospective enactments. 144
The first to apply for registration under the new enactments was
a U.S. corporation. 45
The toxic chemical import regulations were closely modeled
after a 1982 enactment imposing fees on domestic entities dis-
charging certain particularly hazardous pollutants. 46 For toxic
residues that were not directly discharged into the air, such as
those containing arsenic, cadmium, chromium, lead, mercury or
cyanide, the fee was adjusted to reflect the means of the waste's
"disposal." Only two forms of solid waste disposal are specified in
the fee schedule: (1) piling-up residue containing any of these
substances in the open air (without waterproofing), and (2) dis-
charging it into a water body.147
It is difficult to ascertain the effectiveness of this fee schedule
because statistics pertaining to the generation and disposal of
waste are notoriously unreliable due to corruption, government
secrecy, and the undocumentable illicit trade. However, a 1995
study commissioned by the U.S. and Foreign Commercial Service
in Beijing estimated that China domestically produces about 600
million tons of hazardous solid waste each year and that it has
likely accumulated a total of 5.97 billion tons of industrial solid
waste. 148 In 1993, China's PRC-NEPA announced that in 1992
China had domestically produced 620 million tons of solid indus-
trial wastes (without distinctions as to the relative degrees of haz-
143. See JAPAN CHEMICAL WK., supra note 142.
144. See Roberts, supra note 129.
145. The corporation was 3M. See CHINA CHEMICAL REP., supra note
142.
146. Interim Procedures [from the State Council on Imposing
Fees for Discharging Wastes] (Promulgated by the State Council), Feb.
5, 1982, Law No. 820205, in 1 PRC STATUTES, supra note 127.
147. See id. tbl. 3 ("The Schedule of Waste Discharge Fees"). The
fee for water discharge was 18 times the rate for piling toxic residuum.
See id.
148. See Government to Step Up Inspections, supra note 9.
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ardousness) and that the portion not discharged into waterways
(and thus subject to far higher permit fees 149) was deposited in
above-ground piles which as of that year cumulatively covered
134,671 acres.150
Some observers have expressed doubts that regulation and ad-
ditional enforcement will be sufficient to significantly affect even
the problem of domestically-generated wastes. 1 ' In terms of es-
tablishing a statutory regime, Chinese environmental law and
regulation are now reasonably complete. The enforcement agen-
cies, however, have had the double burden of being chronically
understaffed and, even more problematically, directly answerable
to government bodies which often have direct financial interests
in local industries. 52 Moreover, the difficulty of enforcing the
regulations against all shipments of waste from abroad may be
insurmountable. This is simply due to the difficulties posed by
the sheer volume of traffic moving through Chinese ports, and
the ease with which illegal shipments of waste may slip through
because of deliberately mislabelled containers or bribed offi-
cials.'53 Government officials have also acknowledged that numer-
ous Chinese concerns profit from the illegal importation of haz-
ardous waste and, it is more than likely that a number of
government officials profit from the trade as well.
54
149. See PRC STATUTES, supra note 146, tbl. 3.
150. See Protection Not Keeping Pace, supra note 124.
151. See China: Enforcement of New Waste Disposal Laws Depends on
Foreign Expertise, Report Says, Int'l Env't Daily (BNA), at d6 (Sept. 30,
1996) (quoting a report by Jay Sennett, program associate at the Inter-
national Institute of George Mason University, at a conference organ-
ized by Hong Kong's Center for Environmental Technology on his
study of municipal solid waste management in Jiangsu, China's fourth
most populated province).
152. Environmental protection bureaus are authorized to assess
fines, but closing down a polluting operation requires the direct ap-
proval of the government corresponding to the administrative level of
the agency (national or provincial). See China Strategy, supra note 123. It
is estimated, for example, that the People's Liberation Army owns ap-
proximately 20,000 Chinese companies outright. See Deng's China: The
Last Emperor, supra note 8, at 25.
153. See Smith, supra note 121.
154. See Government to Step Up Inspections, supra note 9.
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These difficulties, however, in no way preclude China's compli-
ance with the Basel Convention. "Disposal" of wastes through
above-ground piling or discharge into water bodies would not be
considered environmentally unsound under any provision of the
Convention. One potential conflict could exist between the Con-
vention's emphasis on the free exchange of information between
states, and China's strict policies on state secrecy.155 Information
on China's domestic environmental conditions is strictly con-
trolled if not totally suppressed. 15 6 There are no avenues for a
non-governmental international agency, like Greenpeace, to op-
erate within China. Unsurprisingly, Chinese leadership views
such agencies as a threat, however trivial, to its monopoly on
power and the dissemination of information.5 7 Under the Con-
vention's notice-and-consent procedure, therefore, China could
grant or withhold its consent to a shipment of waste from
abroad, but an exporting state would have no reasonable assur-
ance as to the waste's environmentally-sound disposal. 158
Another complication arises from the often conflicting objec-
tives of factions within the Chinese government. China's recent
tightening of its environmental regulations is no doubt justified
by domestic conditions, not the least of which is the govern-
155. See Yojana Sharma, China: Secrecy Hindering Economic Reform, IN-
TER PRESS SERV., Apr. 25, 1995, available in LEXIS, New Library, Inpres
File.
"The definition of state secret is so vague that it is almost im-
possible to know whether information obtained in China is
classified or not," said a Hong Kong businessman. "The up-
shot is, few people (in China) are willing to tell you anything
at all of value even if tying up a deal is of major benefit to
them" . . . . "Anything not publicized through official chan-
nels could be termed a state secret," notes Hong Kong-based
China watcher Wu Zhong.
Id.
156. See Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China (Adopted
by the 2nd Session of the 5th National People's Congress on July 1,
1979), Law No. 790706, ch. 8, art. 186, in 1 PRC STATUTES, supra note
127 ("Those government staff members who violate the regulation on
security, revealing important national secrets, shall be sentenced to up to
7 years in prison.") (emphasis added).
157. See Cheung, supra note 125.
158. See Basel Convention, supra note 1, art. 4, § 9.
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ment's increasing awareness that the shift from a centrally-
controlled economy to a market-driven one requires environmen-
tal regulation of an order significantly different than that con-
templated at the time of the Environmental Protection Law of
1979.159 On the other hand, the utility of these new laws as a po-
litical instrument should not be discounted. Commentators have
cited two possible rationales. Internally, Communist hardliners in
the government may be using the stringent environmental regu-
lations as a way of partially reining in the capitalism unleashed
by Deng Xiao-Ping's economic policies. 160 Externally, likely use of
the regulations as a tool in China's foreign relations is possibly
evidenced by the initial targeting of foreign waste generators. 61
Even more pointedly, China adopted an increasingly strident
tone on the subject of hazardous waste in its targeting of the
United States 62 at the same time that American trade negotiators
were threatening trade sanctions over China's failure to come to
terms over the pirating of intellectual property. 63
On October 30, 1995, the Standing Committee adopted the
Law on Solid Waste Pollution Prevention and Control, which in-
troduced an outright ban on the import of numerous varieties of
159. See China: Changing Economy Driving Force in Revising Environ-
ment Law, Official Says, 18 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 546 (July 12, 1995).
160. See Yojana Sharma, China-Environment: Politics Aside, Activists
Laud New Waste Law, INTER PRESS SERV., June 5, 1996, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Inpres File.
161. See Roberts, supra note 129.
162. See Sharma, supra note 155.
Environmentalists in Hong Kong are well aware of but un-
concerned by the anti-U.S. rhetoric that has come with the
legislation, saying the new law may yet provide a way to elim-
inate the ecological and health problems posed by huge
stockpiles of hazardous waste imported into China - much
of it illegally.
The main worry of green groups here, noted one ac-
tivist, was that "when it suits Beijing's purpose to no longer
lambaste the West, they will ignore the problem and allow it
to get out of hand again.
"Political campaigns are an unreliable way to ensure
long term environmental improvements," he added.
Id.
163. See Faison, supra note 16.
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waste and established stiff fines for violations. 164 Shortly thereaf-
ter, PRC-NEPA announced that an amendment to China's Crimi-
nal Code would make certain environmental crimes punishable
by death, at least officially. 65 In the same announcement, China
criticized foreign governments, particularly the U.S., for alleged
illegal exports of waste to China. The Chinese government fur-
ther indicated that, under the new regulations, foreigners con-
victed of unlawfully shipping solid waste to China could be fined
up to one million Chinese yuan (U.S. $125,000).166
One month after the stringent new regulations went into ef-
fect, PRC-NEPA announced that it had blocked the entry of
"tons of household, medical, and toxic waste illegally shipped
from the United States and Canada."' 67 PRC-NEPA also claimed
it discovered numerous other illegal foreign shipments, mostly of
household garbage, (which is not covered by the Basel Conven-
tion 68 ), said to have occurred at least over the previous two
years. 69 PRC-NEPA cited one shipment discovered in Qingdao,
totaling 640 metric tons, mislabeled "waste paper" but actually
containing medical waste' 70 (which is covered by the Conven-
tionl7'). Curiously, when U.S. government agencies offered to as-
164. See New Chinese Law to Bar Solid Waste Imports Useless as Raw
Materials, Limit Usable Waste, Int'l Env't Daily (BNA), Nov. 9, 1995, at d4
(Nov. 9, 1995).
165. See China: Imperiling Environment Capital Offense Under Law to be
Enacted in April 1996, 18 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 913 (Nov. 29, 1995).
166. See id.
167. See China: Authorities Investigate Alleged Import of Toxic, Other
Wastes from Outside Country, 19 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 459 (May 29,
1996) [hereinafter Authorities Investigate].
168. See Basel Convention, supra note 1, art. 1, § 2 & Annex II.
169. The Chinese authorities arrested an American businessman,
William Ping Chen, in June of 1996 for allegedly shipping two hundred
thirty-eight tons of household garbage from California to Shanghai. On
Jan. 13, 1997, he was convicted, fined $60,000 and expelled from the
country. See Faison, supra note 16.
170. See Authorities Investigate, supra note 167; Garbage Case Probe
Must Go Deeper, CHINA DAILY, May 18, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Li-
brary, Chidly File; Officials in China Find Another Large Shipment of U.S.
Trash, Associated Press, May 20, 1996, available in 1996 WL 4424177.
171. See Basel Convention, supra note 1, art.. 1, § l(a), Annex I,
§ Yl & Annex III.
1997]
340 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. VIII
sist in an investigation of the illegal shipments, the Chinese au-
thorities did not respond. U.S. authorities were able to
corroborate that one of the shipments contained household
waste, but could not verify PRC-NEPA's claim that this same ship-
ment also contained hazardous waste. 72
Nevertheless, on May 24, 1996, the People's Daily accused the
United States of committing a "malicious act in disregard of in-
ternational morality and justice,"' 73 and stated that the Chinese
government had filed a formal complaint to the Basel Conven-
tion against the U.S. 74 In June, the Chinese government took ad-
vantage of World Environmental Day to further attack the U.S.:
Ironically, it is the United States that has always been claiming
it is concerned about human rights and environmental protec-
tion . . . .If the US government is at all concerned about
human rights, it should do something to stop the dirty busi-
ness. That is the basic demand of respecting human rights, of
international convention and human morality. 75
Intriguingly, a U.S. State Department spokesman characterized
the Chinese government's threat to send the Qingdao waste back
to the U.S. 76 as a "propaganda effort," and more curiously, as a
matter that had nothing to do with the U.S. government. I7
III. CHINA VS. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
China has already demonstrated a willingness to seek formal
legal redress for the illegal import of hazardous waste against for-
eign persons or entities within its jurisdiction. 7 8 Without ques-
tion, there are no barriers to the Chinese government's prosecu-
tion of wholly domestic entities for similar violations, although
the same could be said of any other developing nation with a
172. See China: Officials Reject U.S. Aid in Investigation of Alleged Ship-
ments of Toxic, Other Wastes, 19 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 500 (1996).
173. See id.
174. See supra note 15.
175. China Attacks US Over Export of Waste, Agence France-Presse,
June 5, 1996, available in 1996 WL 3865529.
176. This would, of course, be the remedy available under the Ba-
sel Convention, supra note 1, arts. 8 & 9, § 2.
177. See Vivien Pik-Kwan Chan, US Medical Waste to be Sent Back, S.
CHINA MORNING POST, May 11, 1996, available in 1996 WL 3757646.
178. See Faison, supra note 16.
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statutory regime in place. What differentiates China in this re-
gard is the delicacy and complexity of its relationship with the
ostensible defendant: the United States. Although China's objec-
tive may be political redress, assessment of China's legal options
produces the most enlightening analysis.
In seeking a legal remedy against the United States for im-
proper export of hazardous waste to China, China would have
three theoretical avenues within the norms of international law:
(1) international dispute resolution, (2) litigation, and (3) nego-
tiation. This section examines each avenue in turn.
A. International Dispute Resolution
China might attempt to seek a resolution of the dispute
through international mechanisms. China might actually file a
complaint with the Secretariat of the Basel Convention, which it
claimed to have done in May, 1996.179 China might also seek ad-
judication in the International Court of Justice or arbitration
under international law.
A complaint by China against the U.S. within the formal struc-
tures of the Basel Convention is, quite obviously, not truly an op-
tion. As a non-party state, the U.S. is not subject to the Conven-
tion's arbitration procedures, which are designed to resolve
disputes "between Parties," 180 and it is against the Convention's
explicit precepts to make a non-party state so subject without
obliging it either to ratify the Convention first or to negotiate a
separate bilateral treaty with the party-state involved in the
dispute. 181
The Convention's dispute-settlement procedures are, however,
strikingly generic in terms of the norms of international law. Par-
ties are advised initially to settle any dispute as to the Conven-
tion's terms through negotiation or "any other peaceful
means." '82 Failing that, Parties have the option of submitting the
dispute either to the International Court of Justice ("ICJ"), or to
arbitration under the procedures set forth in an annex to the
179. See supra note 13.
180. See Basel Convention, supra note 1, art. 20, § 1.
181. See Basel Convention, supra note 1, art. 4, § 5 & art. 11, § 1.
182. See id. at art. 20, § 1.
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Convention.18 3
The question arises as to whether China could seek adjudica-
tion in the ICJ1s4 or arbitration outside of the Convention, simply
by applying the substantive aspects of international environmen-
tal regulation as if they constituted customary law. Thus, it would
be necessary under the terms of the Vienna Convention on Trea-
ties ("Vienna Convention") 85 to determine what would consti-
tute a "peremptory norm" - in effect, a universally recognized le-
gal principle. The immediate difficulty is that the nearest that
the applicable international environmental law has to a "peremp-
tory norm" is Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration. 186 With-
out the adaptations of Principle 21 embodied in the Basel Con-
vention, the accepted corollary of Principle 21 is of very little use
in the case of a pollution source transfer, including the apparent
illegal shipment from the U.S. to China. The terms of the Basel
Convention remain the base threshold for extending Principle
21 in such a way that both export and import states may be an-
swerable for damages resulting from improper transboundary
shipments of hazardous waste.
The United States, moreover, has made the terms of its ratifi-
cation exceedingly clear, in that implementing legislation is a
necessary prerequisite. This precludes the use of the Convention
as a source of international law in adjudicating or arbitrating a
dispute between the China and the United States. Without re-
course to the Convention, there is insufficient law to apply here.
The barriers posed by the singularities of the hazardous waste
transfer issue only indicate once again why the Basel Convention
was necessary in the first place.
183. See id. at art. 20, § 2 & annex VI.
184. Although the issue is mooted by the subsequent discussion, it
should be noted that neither China nor the U.S. is currently subject to
compulsory jurisdiction in the ICJ.
185. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.39/27, 1980 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 58 (Cmnd. 7964), art. 53. "[A] per-
emptory norm . . . is a norm accepted and recognized by the interna-
tional community of States as a whole as a norm from which no dero-
gation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent
norm of general international law having the same character." Id.
186. See supra text accompanying notes 21-25.
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B. Litigation
In addition to prosecuting violators of its laws in Chinese
courts, China or a Chinese entity might consider bringing suit
against an American entity in a U.S. court. An analysis of China's
prospects in this regard speaks as much to the ability of the
United States to extend its influence abroad under existing law
as it does to China's ability to do so.
As in the context of international dispute resolution, the provi-
sions of the Basel Convention could not be applied as customary
international law in an action in a U.S. court, as Congress has
made it manifestly clear that the Convention will have no legal
effect on the U.S. prior to full implementation.'87 Despite the in-
applicability of the Convention itself as a source of substantive
law, a hypothetical action by China in a U.S. court applying do-
mestic environmental law raises some interesting issues.
One case, Amlon Metals, Inc. v. FMC Corp.,'88 decided subse-
quent to the U.S. signing of the Basel Convention, is very much
on point. In Amlon, a U.K. importer of metal wastes for recycling
brought an action against its U.S. supplier for the alleged mis-
labelling and illegal shipment of unusable solid wastes to the
plaintiff's plant.189 The U.K. plaintiff initially brought suit in a
British court, which dismissed the complaint on the grounds that
all of the relevant actions by the defendant occurred in the U.S.
and that U.S. law should apply. 90 A year and a half later, the
plaintiff sued in U.S. federal court.' 91 Amlon arises from the
defendant's motion to dismiss the plaintiff's two key claims: one
under RCRA and the other under the Alien Tort Statute. 192 In
finding for the defendant on both issues, the court's reasoning
was rooted in the fact that the U.S. had not implemented the
Basel Convention. In effect, Amlon clearly demonstrates that the
United States' non-party status precludes even the use of its do-
187. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF
THE UNITED STATES, §§ 111 (3), (4) (b).
188. 775 F. Supp. 668 (S.D.N.Y 1991).
189. See id. at 669-70.
190. Id. at 670
191. Id.
192. Id. at 669.
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mestic environmental laws in addressing illegal exports of hazard-
ous wastes.
The plaintiff's attempt to reach the defendant's actions by way
of the Alien Tort Statute 193 was also forestalled by the United
States' non-party status. By the language of the Alien Tort Stat-
ute, the threshold requirement is that the tort be a "violation of
the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.1 194 Obviously,
the plaintiff did not claim any treaty violation, as the only appli-
cable treaty would have been the Basel Convention. Instead, the
plaintiff claimed that the defendant's actions constituted a viola-
tion of the "law of nations." The only international law upon
which the plaintiff could rely, however, was - once again - Princi-
ple 21 of the Stockholm Declarationl" and a variation of the
same principle set forth in the Restatement of Foreign Relations
Law.196 Under the guidelines for this threshold requirement set
by the Second Circuit, a wrong is a violation of "the law of na-
tions" sufficient to trigger the statute only when nations have for-
mally asserted by way of "express international accord," that the
wrong is of "mutual" concern. 197 The only such "express interna-
tional accord" would be the Basel Convention. Significantly, the
court did not consider Principle 21 or the Restatement section to
be expressive of substantive law, but rather considered them as
expressions of an admonitory principle as to the "responsibility
of nations."1 9
193. 28 U.S.C. § 1350. "Alien's action for tort: The district courts
shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort
only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States." Id.
194. See id.
195. See supra note 24.
196. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE
UNITED STATES § 602(2). "[W]here pollution originating in a state has
caused significant injury to persons outside that state . . . the state of
origin is obligated to accord to the person injured . ..access to the
same . . .remedies as are available ... to persons within the state." Id.
197. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 888 (2d Cir. 1980) (cited
in 775 F. Supp. at 671).
198. 775 F. Supp. at 671. Compare Seneviratne, supra note 87 (re-
marks of Australian official).
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The more significant issue in Amlon was whether RCRA could
be applied extraterritorially and no other court has addressed it
since. 99 The court cited a great deal of legislative history indicat-
ing that Congress had in no way intended the "citizen suit" pro-
vision to apply extraterritorially. 200 While this alone would have
been dispositive, the court broadened its holding to preclude ex-
traterritorial application of any provisions of RCRA, lacking evi-
dence that Congress clearly intended RCRA to have extraterrito-
rial effect. 20 1 Most persuasive to the court was that one of the
numerous Basel Convention implementation bills was at that
time pending in Congress.202 The court considered the pending
bill, at the very least, "probative of the fact members of Congress
considered that RCRA in its present form does not reach waste
located in another country."2 3
The court's broad finding that RCRA could have no extraterri-
torial application moots and subsumes one issue raised by the
plaintiff: whether the significant acts of the defendant within the
U.S. in gathering and exporting the waste could trigger extrater-
ritorial application of RCRA under the terms established by the
Second Circuit in Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell.204
The Leasco criteria are ambiguous, however. In that case, the Sec-
ond Circuit suggested that while a statute is not necessarily pre-
cluded from extraterritorial application absent clear congres-
sional intent to that effect, it would be "equally erroneous" to
assume, without full interpretive analysis, that Congress intends
the fullest possible application of the statute. 205 In Amlon, the Dis-
trict Court simply found sufficient evidence that Congress did
not intend RCRA to have extraterritorial effect and thus declined
199. See 775 F. Supp. at 670.
200. See id. at 675-76.
201. See id.
202. See id. at 674 n.8 ("One of the proposed findings of the bill
was that 'existing Federal laws do not provide for any review by the
United States of the effects of its exported wastes on the environment
of the countries to which the waste is sent.' ")(quoting Waste Export
Control Act, S. 2598, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2(a) (4) in 138 CONG. REc.
S8,809-10) (daily ed. June 29, 1988)).
203. 775 F. Supp. at 674 n.8.
204. 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972).
205. See id. at 1334.
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to address the issue of the defendant's domestic actions.20 6
As the court's holding is based largely on an inference from
the Basel Convention implementation process, however, it is en-
tirely conceivable that the court could have alternatively found
no express congressional intent to preclude extraterritorial effect
and proceeded to reach the defendant's actions under the Leasco
criteria. Moreover, there is nothing in the language of the RCRA
"citizen suit" provision that would preclude an interpretation
based on the "pollution source transfer" principle.20 7 The cur-
rent limbo of the implementation process, however, has effec-
tively made this impossible. Under Amlon, therefore, a foreign
importer of hazardous waste has no legal redress against a U.S.
exporter under U.S. law: not only for unlawful acts abroad, but
also for the exporter's acts in the U.S. Theoretically, a foreign
party might have had better prospects under U.S. law before the
Basel Convention existed.
C. Negotiation
China and the U.S. might negotiate a separate agreement spe-
cifically addressing their bilateral trade in hazardous waste, such
that a formal mechanism would be in place to discourage recur-
rence of such improper shipments. If the United States were al-
ready a party to the Convention, this would be the most practical
option and would be as logical an extension of the Convention's
purposes as the Bamako Convention.2 0 1
Today, such a bilateral treaty with the U.S. governing hazard-
ous waste transfers to China would also be precluded by China's
206. See 775 F. Supp. at 673 n.5.
207. See 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B) (1994).
[A]ny person may commence a civil action on his own be-
half . . . against any person . . . including any past or present
generator, past or present transporter, or past or present owner
or operator of a treatment, storage, or disposal facility, who has
contributed or who is contributing to the past or present han-
dling, storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal of any
solid or hazardous waste which may present an imminent and
substantial endangerment to health or the environment.
Id.
208. See supra text accompanying notes 77-80.
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party-status and the necessity for the U.S. to amend RCRA, at the
very least, to ensure that the governing standards were not less
environmentally sound than those of the Convention. 0 9 Cer-
tainly, as has been previously indicated, China and the U.S.
could quite easily execute a bilateral treaty for the export of
China's hazardous waste to the U.S. for disposal.
210
All three of China's theoretical options are directly precluded
by the Basel Convention and each nation's status, as party and
non-party respectively. The complementary impact on the United
States' options is equally evident. Without ratifying the Basel
Convention, the U.S. cannot negotiate export agreements with
party-states, which include most of the likely importing states.
Since the U.S. did not complete the Basel Convention imple-
mentation process, the U.S. cannot even use its own laws to cur-
tail harmful activity by exporters within its jurisdiction. If foreign
waste importers accept shipments of waste from the U.S., they do
so at the risk of having no legal redress for improprieties by U.S.
exporters.
The primary effect of China's public protest is to highlight the
negative moral example that the U.S. has set by failing to imple-
ment the Convention.2 1 1 China stands to benefit just as much
from this in the potentially greater willingness on the part of the
U.S. to provide China with increased technical and economic
support, as much as it would from the specific remedy of a
reimportation of a load of medical waste from Qingdao, under
the Basel Convention. 212
Neither government truly benefits from the status quo, how-
ever. China's complaint both obscures and accentuates that na-
tion's genuinely grave environmental situation: one that will al-
most certainly require the resources of the United States, and
perhaps other states, to rectify. The United States' non-party sta-
tus makes the gesture possible, but the status and the gesture
serve only to make direct action even more remote unless the
209. See Basel Convention, supra note 1, art. 11, § 1.
210. See supra note 115.
211. See supra note 89.
212. See Basel Convention, supra note 1, art. 8.
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United States puts aside its cavils over the Second Conference's
amendment and speedily ratifies the Convention.
CONCLUSION
To a considerable extent, the relationship between the United
States and China may be too singular for the nations' dispute
over hazardous waste shipments to be truly emblematic of the
problem that the Basel Convention was intended to remedy. Yet
the singularity makes a number of principles evident.
It is not simply that the bargaining position of the United
States, at least on a "moral" level, would be enhanced by imple-
mentation. Regardless of the attempts by party-states to impose a
moratorium on all transboundary waste trade, it is vital that the
U.S. be a part of the ongoing development of transboundary
hazardous waste regulation, if only to facilitate the continuance
of those exports of waste from U.S. generators that cannot be ef-
ficiently disposed of domestically or, better, eliminated alto-
gether. It is also vital to the protection of its own interests that
the United States have the means to affect this form of polluting
activity abroad. Reciprocally, the Convention can ultimately be vi-
able only with the full participation of the world's largest indus-
trialized nation. As it stands, the Convention is largely a state-
ment of mere principles, however valuable a foundation for the
further development of waste regulation those principles may be.
From the viewpoint of China, however, the United States' fail-
ure to implement the Convention simply means that China's for-
mal complaint to the Convention is essentially a rhetorical ges-
ture. Yet, China's readiness to utilize the Convention's
mechanism, even rhetorically, may well evidence its genuine re-
solve to aggressively address its own environmental situation with-
out abjuring the use of international instruments (and thus not
using its often-bruited sovereignty as a barrier). It may also indi-
cate that these largely untested international instruments are
viewed by China - and perhaps, by extension, other developing
nations - as genuinely effective, even if the development of these
effects and the body of customary law governing the trans-
boundary trade in hazardous waste is almost wholly prospective
in nature. If for no other reason, this alone should impel the
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United States to cease hesitation and ratify the Convention
immediately.

